tls: add optional server certificate verification - #5144
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Codecov Report❌ Patch coverage is
Additional details and impacted files@@ Coverage Diff @@
## master #5144 +/- ##
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- Coverage 80.92% 80.84% -0.09%
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Files 393 393
Lines 98107 98316 +209
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+ Hits 79392 79480 +88
- Misses 18715 18836 +121
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It also seems the test against |
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AI-Assisted: yes (GPT-5.6-Cyber)
Verification defaulted to on, which changed behaviour for every existing caller: this client is routinely pointed at servers whose certificates are not meant to verify. It is now off unless asked for, which is what the existing tests wanted -- the six verify=False opt-outs they needed are gone. Passing cafile turns it on, since supplying a CA and getting no checking would be worse than either. A refusal logged only "verification failed". It now logs which check failed, alongside the other TLS refusals. AI-Assisted: yes (gpt-5.6-sol)
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gpotter2
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Sorry, I still have comments :( Thanks again for the work and sorry about that
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CertTree.verify() and CMS_Engine.verify() gain allow_expired, defaulting to False so the expiry check stays on everywhere it already was. A CMS signature is usually checked long after it was made, and the PKINIT tests are a real captured MIT Kerberos exchange whose client certificate was valid 2025-09-20 to 2026-09-20. The signature it carries is genuine; only the clock has moved on, so those two tests pass allow_expired=True. AI-Assisted: yes (GPT-5.6-Cyber)
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I had a look at the failing test. Verification itself isn't the problem (the client rejects the server as expected) but the test hangs afterwards while stopping the server. When the client fails, Letting the server thread read END before calling --- a/scapy/layers/tls/automaton_srv.py
+++ b/scapy/layers/tls/automaton_srv.py
- def stop(self):
+ def stop(self, wait=True):
...
- return super(TLSServerAutomaton, self).stop()
+ return super(TLSServerAutomaton, self).stop(wait=wait)
- def forcestop(self):
+ def forcestop(self, wait=True):
...
- return super(TLSServerAutomaton, self).forcestop()
+ return super(TLSServerAutomaton, self).forcestop(wait=wait)
--- a/test/scapy/layers/tls/tlsclientserver.uts
+++ b/test/scapy/layers/tls/tlsclientserver.uts
print("Client crashed:", final_reason.atmt_origfunc)
+ # The server is still running, and th_ is waiting in atmtsrv.run()
+ # for its END message. Let th_ read it: stop() empties the same pipe,
+ # and hangs if th_ takes the message first.
+ atmtsrv.stop(wait=False)
+ th_.join(timeout=5)
else:Two other things I found while testing:
With these changes, |
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Thanks a lot for lookint into this @KernelClint ! I removed the tests because they were too different from the other tests in the file (and one of them was misplaced in the wrong section). They are useful, of course, but I didn't think I'd have time fixing it before 2.8.0 (I'd wanted to merge this PR quickly)... it's a bit lazy i know |
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TLSClientAutomatoncompletes a handshake and sends application data without checking the server'scertificate against a trust store or the hostname it asked for. It is a test client, and it does
not claim otherwise — but there is no way to ask it to check, which makes it awkward to use against
a real service where that is the point.
The relevant states pass the certificate through without a policy:
scapy/layers/tls/automaton_cli.py:118-142takes the server name but has no trust store, and
:396-405advances past a TLS 1.2 Certificatemessage without authenticating it.
The change adds verification and makes it selectable. When enabled, an explicit CA bundle is used if
one is supplied and the system trust store otherwise, the requested hostname is checked, and the
connection closes on failure.
verify=Falsekeeps the current behaviour for the cases wheretalking to an untrusted server is the whole point of the exercise.
The added regressions cover a self-signed server, a valid certificate for the wrong hostname, and a
correct server, asserting the first two close the connection and the third completes. Without the
source change they fail.
On cost. Performance was measured on one computer, before and after the fix, but there is not
much of a "before" to measure: the client performs no verification today, so its valid path does
nothing. Verifying took 2.9 µs per handshake, against 819 ns of test overhead — roughly 2.1 µs
added, once per connection, for a full chain and hostname check. A percentage against a path that
does no work would not mean anything, so none is quoted.